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Introduction: Cultural Memory and Cultural Identity 
How does one begin to memorialise an event of which there is little or no direct memory? 
Contemporary cultural memory of the Holocaust is almost monolithic in scope, constructed 
out of myriad fragments of image, narrative and artefact, and deeply ingrained into the 
Western cultural consciousness. And yet the very term „cultural memory‟ may well be a 
misnomer: it evokes a deliberate act of collective memory that lays claim to an understanding 
of the past that is problematic to say the least, given the extreme complexity and oft-cited 
unknowability of the Holocaust as both an event and an experience. Furthermore, memory 
defines itself through its relationship to forgetfulness, a dialectic which is problematised by the 
lack of available knowledge and understanding surrounding the Holocaust experience. When 
we speak of cultural memory of the Holocaust, it is true that this discourse is framed by a 
need to prevent forgetting in the future; however, this drive for cultural memorialisation 
proceeds not from an act of forgetting, but from the complete absence of memory. Given 
these complicating factors, this paper proceeds from the position that, with regard to the 
Holocaust, cultural amnesia may provide a more appropriate framework for memorialisation 
than the oft-cited, potentially oxymoronic „cultural memory of the Holocaust.‟ 
The identity („self-image‟) of a specific culture is characterised by the way in which it views 
its own history, filtered through a “collective image of the past” (Asmann and Czaplicka 127). 
Access to this history (and by extension the image) is regulated via the practice of cultural 
memory: “a collective concept for all knowledge that directs behaviour and experience in the 
interactive framework of a society and one that obtains through generations in repeated 
societal practice and initiation” (126). Significantly, cultural memory is not an automatic reflex 
of the collective body of knowledge that constitutes a culture; rather it is in itself a construct, 
designed to incorporate the events of history into a frame of reference appropriate to the 
culture itself. In this sense it is not strictly a form of memory at all, but another series of 
cultural practices akin to narrative. As Susan Sontag notes, “what is called collective memory 
is not a remembering but a stipulating: that this is important, and this is the story about how it 
happened […]. Ideologies create substantiating archives of images, representative images, 
which encapsulate common ideas of significance and trigger predictable thoughts, feelings” 
(76-77). Cultural memory thus works in a similar manner to the literary concept of genre, 
insofar as it ultimately works to provide a frame of reference through which cultural meaning 
can be attributed to an object, be it text or event. It can be defined precisely in its mediatory 
relation between culture and history, although achieving such a definition is by no means a 
simple feat. Memory is nothing if not intangible, a fact that holds true as much for the 
individual as it does on a wider cultural level; so arriving at a definite version of something 
labelled „cultural memory‟ is in itself a challenging prospect. In order to understand cultural 
memory, and by further implication, its opposite, cultural amnesia, it is necessary to begin by 
identifying the distinction between memory and history, two concepts that appear to go hand 
in hand with each other, but which are in fact entirely distinct entities. However, as Paul 
Ricoeur notes, it is sometimes very difficult to identify the boundary between the two: “the 
frontier is not so easy to trace as it might seem between individual memory and that past 
before any memory which is the historical past” (3:114). Ricoeur thus identifies the border 
between history and memory as primarily a temporal one; for Pierre Nora, memory and 
history are separated by the subjective nature of the former and the objective nature of the 
latter: 
Memory is life, always embodied in societies and as such in permanent evolution, subject to the 
dialectic of remembering and forgetting, unconscious of the distortions to which it is subject, 
vulnerable in various ways to appropriation and manipulation, and capable of lying dormant for 
long periods only to be suddenly reawakened. History, on the other hand, is the reconstruction, 
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always problematic and incomplete, of what is no longer […]. Memory, being a phenomenon of 
emotion and magic, accommodates only those facts that suit it. It thrives on vague, telescoping 
reminiscences, on hazy general impressions or specific symbolic details. It is vulnerable to 
transferences, screen memories, censorings, and projections of all kinds. History, being an 
intellectual, nonreligious activity, calls for analysis and critical discourse. (3) 
What can we learn from this about the nature of memory? First, that it is distinct from 
history precisely because it is, as Nora puts it, “life”: memory is a constantly evolving, living 
thing, which places it in counterpoint to history, history that is concerned entirely with “what is 
no longer,” the past. Memory is, in this sense, “a phenomenon of the present” (3), which 
seeks to interpret the past in order to make it intelligible for the present. Second, as an 
interpretive act, memory is therefore not infallible: it is, as Nora comments, subject to multiple 
renegotiations in the forms listed above. In addition to this, there is also a sense in which 
history is seen as objective because historical fact is the same for all concerned, whereas 
“Memory wells up from groups that it welds together” (3). Memory in this sense can thus be 
viewed as the subjective interpretation of the past (history), as it appears to a particular group 
in the present moment. The relation of memory to the group as formulated by Nora is 
inherently symbiotic: the group is bound and defined by a common view of the past (as 
mentioned in the introductory definition of culture); the group thus produces a collective 
version of the past to act as the „official‟ memory. Memory becomes the filter through which 
historical record is made pertinent, and accessible, present. This type of collectivised 
memory, however, depends for its success in constructing a group identity upon an intrinsic 
act of forgetting, thus locating the amnesiac consciousness at the core of an act of 
memorialisation. 
Remembering and Forgetting 
As Nora comments above, all memory is “subject to the dialectic of remembering and 
forgetting.” Memory and forgetfulness are often posed within the cultural imaginary as a pair 
of binary opposites; however, this is a simplistic view of the processes of memorialisation. A 
more appropriate term can be borrowed from Gillian Rose: instead of constructing 
remembering and forgetting as a binary, we should envisage them as a “non-contrary double” 
(109), existing not in precise opposition but in a dialectical relationship, each dependent upon 
the other. In the same way that mourning the death of another might act inversely as an 
affirmation of life, so too an act of forgetting brings us to the edge of memory, reminding us of 
what we need to remember. Sontag may be right when noting that constructing a collective 
memory involves selecting the memories that are important enough to be remembered, but 
the inverse is also true. In deciding what to remember, we automatically decide what to forget. 
As Stier comments, any act of memorialisation is simultaneously caught up with forgetting: 
“For memory to matter, it must ultimately deal with forgetting. Forgetting raises its ugly head 
in every memorial situation, as its double, its ghost brother” (191). In this way, the prospect of 
forgetting can be useful: it constantly shadows memory as a „ghost‟ that warns us of the 
dangers of not-remembering. More controversially, Stier also suggests that forgetting is a 
useful tool in the memorialisation of the Holocaust, in so far as it enables us to forget each 
failure of commemoration, and begin again: 
in constructing memorial representations of the past, we always return to the origin because we 
cannot capture beginning in memory. Every attempted representation comes back to this point, if 
for no other reason than that every attempt is inadequate, each one falls short of the monumental 
task in hand. We nonetheless keep trying. Perhaps we can do this because of our infinite 
capacity for forgetting. (191) 
Every attempt at memorialisation is ultimately inadequate due to the inaccessibility of the 
Holocaust experience for cultural memory. The “origin” of which Stier speaks is the event 
itself, completely unavailable from the perspective of the contemporary cultural imagination. 
Here we are not dealing with forgetfulness as such, for this knowledge has never been 
available and therefore can never be forgotten. Rather, it is within this formulation that we 
encounter cultural amnesia; as a sense of memory that is missing but not lost, and with it a 
corresponding rupture within cultural identity. To further cite Stier, “sites of memory emerge at 
points of rupture in order to counteract forgetfulness” (9). Here I would substitute 
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„forgetfulness‟ for „amnesia.‟ Amnesia proceeds from a neurological trauma in the same 
manner that the very inaccessibility of Holocaust memory is conditioned by a traumatic 
rupture in cultural identity. The desire for memory to counteract amnesia presents itself within 
the contemporary cultural imagination in the form of narrative, or more specifically as a “quest 
for narrative, for the ability to tell a story and thereby alleviate a burden” (Stier 2). As a 
response to the absence of memory, contemporary narratives of the Holocaust enter into an 
engagement with this dialectic of memory and forgetfulness, reproducing the amnesiac 
qualities of cultural memory of the Holocaust and calling to mind a second, less common 
usage of the word „amnesia‟: the act of substituting words incorrectly. The attempt to narrate 
the Holocaust into cultural memory can be read as an act of substituting words for 
experience, thereby constructing a culturally-specific version of memory in order to mediate 
the fragmentation and loss inherent within cultural amnesia. The texts that I shall examine in 
this paper are all engaged in this act of substituting words, both implicitly in the terms already 
discussed and explicitly as a means of focusing on the quest for knowledge that characterises 
contemporary Holocaust narrative.  
The Amnesiac Consciousness: Characters, Quests and Fragments 
Both of the texts that I shall be analysing in order to uncover the amnesiac consciousness 
that, I contend, permeates the contemporary narrative response to the Holocaust, can be 
clearly defined as quest narratives. Thus they become immensely useful to us in externalising 
the quest for memory that Stier identifies as crucial to contemporary constructions of cultural 
memory surrounding the Holocaust. Each of these texts, Lily Brett‟s Too Many Men (1999) 
and Jonathan Safran Foer‟s Everything Is Illuminated (2002), also serves to complicate the 
relationship between language and experience, or between the linguistic signifier and the 
corresponding (and illusory) signified of lived Holocaust experience in a manner that reveals 
cultural amnesia at the core of our relationship with the events of the Holocaust.  
Amnesia and Anxiety: “Too Many Men” 
Too Many Men tells the story of Ruth Rothwax, a child of Holocaust survivors, who travels to 
Poland with her father to visit the sites of his past. Ruth is searching for a deeper 
understanding of her parents‟ experiences, which have previously only been available to her 
“always in fragments. [Their past] was never whole. It always had to be pieced together. And 
the missing parts had to be imagined.” As the only child of survivors, Ruth‟s own past is full of 
“so many gaps and vacancies;” her own cultural memory of the Holocaust is “punctured and 
perforated” by the fact of her parents‟ suffering, left with “large hollows and vacancies” (143). 
Thus Ruth understands her parents‟ experiences not from the position of memory, but 
precisely from within the uncertainty and dislocation of amnesia. As a second-generation 
survivor, Ruth‟s relationship to her parents‟ experiences is framed by what Marianne Hirsch 
has termed “postmemory.” This is a phenomenon which “most specifically describes the 
relationship of children of survivors of cultural or collective trauma to the experiences of their 
parents, experiences that they „remember‟ only as the narratives and images with which they 
grew up; however, they are so powerful, so monumental, as to constitute memories in their 
own right.” Postmemory locates itself within the unknowable, has “its basis in 
displacement…vicariousness and belatedness” (9). It is thus akin to cultural amnesia insofar 
as it deals with memory that is largely available only through vicarious appropriation of 
another‟s experience. It offers a framework for the belated traumatic memory experienced by 
the children and grandchildren of survivors; a memory that manifests itself as they struggle to 
come to terms, as Ruth does, not only with their own identities but also with their parents‟ 
access to a knowledge and experience that they can themselves never fully comprehend, 
despite the fact that it has coloured and characterised their entire existence. More than this, 
Hirsch argues, postmemory 
need not be restricted to the family, or even to a group that shares an ethnic or national identity 
marking: through particular forms of identification, adoption and projection, it can be more 
broadly available… Thus, although familial inheritance offers the clearest model for it, 
postmemory need not be strictly an identity position. Instead, I prefer to see it as an 
intersubjective transgenerational space of remembrance, linked specifically to cultural or 
collective trauma. (9-10) 
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Thus, in the same manner that the amnesia of the individual can be read as a microcosmic 
representation of the cultural experience of memory lost, so postmemory acts on both a 
micro- and macrocosmic level to offer a framework for coming to terms with a knowledge that 
we have never had, and a memory that although present has never been remembered. It is 
just such an intersection between personal and cultural amnesia that we encounter in Too 
Many Men. 
The narrative of Too Many Men is framed by the amnesiac consciousness: in the opening 
sentences of the novel, the narrator informs us of Ruth‟s unconscious urge to be violent 
towards Germans:  
the last time Ruth Rothwax had been with a group of Germans, she had wanted to poke their 
eyes out. The feeling had sprung out of her so suddenly and so unexpectedly that it had almost 
bowled her over. Where had this feeling come from? It had been a fully developed, ferocious 
wish‒not some half-baked, halfhearted aggressive inclination. One minute she was deep in her 
own thoughts, the next minute she wanted to gouge an old woman‟s eyeballs out. (1) 
Ruth appears to be motivated in this violent impulse by instinct alone: this is no response to a 
forgotten desire for revenge that resurfaces upon encountering a group of German tourists. 
Rather, it speaks of a memory that does not quite belong to her, but which nonetheless 
carries the power to affect her viscerally: “she had felt nauseated for hours after the incident” 
(1). Ruth‟s desire carries clear echoes of postmemory, which works against forgetting, 
invoking as it does an unconscious act of memorial engagement. Ruth, we discover, has 
been prone to these unconscious acts of engagement throughout her life: as a child, for 
example, she had inexplicable access to knowledge that had not been shared with her: “„I did 
tell Malka that you did know that somebody did pull her hair out,‟ Edek said. „She said it was 
impossible‟. „How could you know?‟ Malka said. „You was six years old. You was not in 
Auschwitz.‟… „Even Mum didn‟t know about Malka‟s hair,‟ Edek said. Ruth felt sick” (53).  
Ruth‟s relationship to this type of knowledge is ambiguous: she surrounds herself with 
facts and figures, almost as a form of insulation against real engagement with the horrors of 
her parents‟ past: “forty-five percent of German doctors became members of the Nazi party 
during the Third Reich. Ruth knew that from her reading” (22-23); “she didn‟t want to hear the 
stories of babies used as footballs by the Gestapo” (22). Here, Ruth appears to embrace the 
objectivity of statistical data even as she distances herself from the subjective suffering 
offered by narrative accounts of Nazi atrocity. It is as if she is, paradoxically, trying to avoid 
the very emotional engagement that she is seeking by returning to Poland with her father. It 
seems that Ruth, like the reader, is not really sure of what she knows or what she wants. It is 
implied repeatedly throughout the text that Ruth‟s obsessive-compulsive disorder, to which 
can be attributed this mania for facts and figures, is a direct result of being a child of 
survivors, and therefore never feeling quite safe in the world, but without knowing why:  
It was a world where everything was erratic…The murderers of these dead people were rarely 
referred to, and Ruth, as a child often wondered who they were, and if she would recognise them 
if she passed them on the street. For years she used to examine the faces of passing strangers 
to see if they contained evidence of murderousness. (44) 
  
Something out of her mother‟s control had driven Rooshka to have Ruth‟s hair cut off. Ruth knew 
that it must have been connected with the chopping off of her mother‟s own long, thick plaits, in 
Auschwitz. (99) 
Again this sense of permanent instability can be read as the work of the amnesiac 
consciousness, externalised via the narrative quest for knowledge that will restore memory, or 
at least construct a memory that is capable of filling the void. Here we can read the dialectic 
between the personal and the cultural, as Ruth seeks to encounter (or construct) knowledge 
of the cultural trauma that has informed her own identity. As part of her quest, Ruth seeks to 
clarify her relationship with the past by tying experiences to physical spaces. However, she 
once again finds herself at a crisis point of disjunction: between the symbolic narrative 
attached to these tourist sites (such as the remnants of the Warsaw ghetto wall), again 
expressed as statistical data, and the semiotic emotional response that renders her 
Anna Hunter, The Amnesiac Consciousness of the Contemporary Holocaust Novel  42 
 
Synthesis 2 (Fall 2010): 38-47 
http://www.enl.uoa.gr/synthesis/issue2_Hunter.htm  
speechless, which cannot be narrated through either numbers or words: “By the end of 1941, 
less than two years after the ghetto had been formed, over one hundred thousand Jews had 
died of exhaustion and starvation…Ruth wept. „It is just a wall,‟ Edek said. „It is just a wall.‟ He 
repeated. But the expression on his face was at odds with his language and his tone” (90-91). 
In this extract, Ruth‟s father, Edek, seeks to override his own memory of the ghetto 
experience with the words “It is just a wall” as though he can erase the horror of his 
experience by substituting an alternative narrative. Edek‟s approach to language is 
idiosyncratic in nature, and Brett uses his non-fluency in English as a tool with which to 
explore this disjunction between signifier and signified, or between experience and symbolic 
representation. Edek‟s insistence on using the auxiliary verb “did” in his construction of the 
past tense (as in the citation above, referring to Ruth‟s subconscious knowledge) reveals the 
synthetic, constructed nature of language when it is applied to experience: by using all of the 
constituent parts of the sentence, language loses what ability it had to express emotion and 
becomes instead a stilted symbolic framework. Although Ruth expects Edek to experience 
some sort of catharsis at being able to use his native Polish, he himself comments: “It is all 
right…I can speak Polish, I can speak English, I can speak German” (96). For Edek, it seems, 
one language is of as much (or as little) use as another when it comes to voicing his 
experiences of the Holocaust.  
Much of Ruth‟s relationship with the world around her is governed by the act of substituting 
words. This is reflected throughout the narrative, which is often halted as Ruth considers 
alternative words to substitute in order to create different meanings within her self-narrative: 
“She hated the word „date‟…It was hard to come up with a better word. „Rendezvous‟ or 
„assignation‟ suggested a mystery that wasn‟t present on most dates. An evening of „social 
intercourse‟ was too wordy, although it did possess the stilted quality of many dates. So Ruth, 
too, used the word „date‟” (33). Ruth‟s preoccupation with words is, in part, one of the ways in 
which she defines her identity: “Why do Jews have this obsession with words? „Because we 
talk so much,‟ Ruth said. „We need all the words we can get‟” (115). 
In this instance, Ruth substitutes a love of words for the gaps in her own sense of Jewish 
identity: gaps that are formed by a lack of memory which is itself conditioned by her parents‟ 
suffering. Developing this, Ruth makes her living writing letters for people who are unable to 
find words of their own; a profession that she finds both satisfying and immensely 
problematic: “Nothing is simple any more. Not even owning your own letters” (102). Ruth uses 
her letter-writing as a repository for the emotional engagement that she has been unable to 
secure in her personal life, either from her parents or any of her three husbands: “Ruth liked 
writing the love letters. She often made herself cry writing a love letter. She would become so 
immersed in the letter that she would get a jolt when she realised that the sentiments that 
were making her cry were of her own fabrication” (58). From this we are able to infer two 
things: first, that language is not tied to a particular experience or emotion, for if Ruth is able 
to manipulate language in such a way as to perfectly address the relationship between 
strangers, then language itself appears fickle and insubstantial. Second, we can identify 
within Ruth‟s letter-writing a distillation of the relationship between the Holocaust and 
contemporary cultural memory of the event, which is essentially a symbolic narrative 
constructed out of the same clichés and empty signifiers that Ruth employs to create a 
synthetic emotional engagement in her love letters. The catharsis that Ruth wishes for Edek is 
constructed for the reader within the pages of a Holocaust narrative such as Too Many Men; 
however, it is a false catharsis predicated upon the expected and accepted tropes of 
Holocaust cultural memory. The quest for knowledge that Ruth has embarked upon is 
resolved when she discovers information about an elder brother who was born in a displaced 
persons‟ camp following her parents‟ liberation. This sense of resolution is problematic, for as 
Robert Eaglestone observes, “The potential closure offered by the discovery of this next 
secret offers a questionable redemption, something that fills the holes of memory” (116). To 
suggest, as this narrative does, that the gaps in cultural memory surrounding the Holocaust 
can be filled by obtaining further knowledge assumes an ontological approach to cultural 
memory that belies the complexity of the fragmented relationship between contemporary 
cultural identity and narratives of the past. It is also at odds with the disjunction between 
knowing and understanding, identified above, that is played out throughout much of the 
narrative. This suggests an amnesiac quality about the novel itself, with regard to how it views 
the construction of cultural memory and its own position within that process. This sense of 
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amnesia can be identified across a range of contemporary Holocaust narratives, and will be 
discussed in greater detail later in this paper.  
Just as the relationship between knowledge, understanding, memory and truth forms a 
spectrum of shades of grey within cultural memory of the Holocaust, so Ruth‟s own 
relationship to the „truth‟ is just as complex, conditioned by a desire for experiential memory to 
fill the gaps in her existence:  
The truth had appeared obscure to Ruth, from the time she was a child. She used to lie a lot. She 
made things up. As a six-year-old she spun whole stories around her lies. Stories of poverty and 
hardship…She had made up relatives. Aunts, uncles, cousins. She made up cousins she loved 
and cousins she disliked. She had made up favourite names and favourite grandparents. She 
invented eight grandparents. (133-34) 
Clearly, Ruth‟s childhood need to narrate an extended family into existence can be said to 
stem from the massive absence of the same, caused by the loss of both her parents‟ families 
in the Holocaust: “The Buchbinders, the Spindlers, the Knobels, and the Brajtsztajns were all 
related to the Rothwaxes. They were all from Lodz. And they were all dead” (135). The habit 
of lying, of storytelling, extends into her adult life as a means of creating and affirming her 
identity. The practice of constructing narratives (both personal and cultural) as consolatory 
substitutes for understanding, experience and identity is readily identifiable within 
contemporary Holocaust narratives written by the descendents of survivors, and also those 
written by authors who have no personal or familial links to the Holocaust outside of their own 
cultural amnesia. This can be read as indicative of the extent to which the contemporary 
cultural imagination is dependent upon such narratives to plug the gap in memory. This 
conceit, of narrative as memory‟s „sticking-plaster,‟ also permeates the text of Jonathan 
Safran Foer‟s Everything Is Illuminated. 
Amnesia and Illumination: “Everything Is Illuminated” 
Everything Is Illuminated contains three narrative strands that are very closely linked: each 
would not be possible without the other two. The first strand encountered by the reader is the 
first-person narrative of Alexander Perchov, an eighteen year-old Ukrainian who is employed 
as a translator for his father‟s tourism business: a company that specialises in tours “for 
Jewish people…who have cravings to leave that ennobled country like America and visit 
humble towns in Poland and Ukraine” (3). It is immediately apparent to the reader that these 
tours consist of American Jews wishing to visit the sites of the concentration camps. Alex, 
however, is shrouded in ignorance: a substantial portion of his narrative is given over to his 
journey towards knowledge. Alex narrates the story of one such tour: the journey of a young 
writer named Jonathan Safran Foer, and referred to throughout by Alex as “the hero,” in other 
words, the focal point of the quest. Alex and his grandfather have been hired to take Jonathan 
to find a Shtetl named Trachimbrod, from which his grandfather escaped to America in 1941. 
The second narrative strand is a magic-realist fictional narrative constructed by Jonathan 
upon his return to America to represent the history of the Shtetl, which has been completely 
destroyed by the Nazis. The final narrative strand is epistolary and is made up of letters sent 
by Alex to Jonathan after the latter has returned to America. By this point (possibly as a result 
of the journey they shared), the two have developed a close friendship: Jonathan, we can 
infer, has been sending Alex drafts of his fictional history, and the letters represent Alex‟s 
reaction to these. Within any of these narrative strands, there is little by way of direct 
reference to the Holocaust, although it permeates the text on every level. It is left to the 
reader to uncover what he/she can in-between the lines of narrative, to seek his/her own 
„illumination.‟ Together, Alex and Jonathan provide a twin representation of the position of the 
reader: Alex‟s well-meaning ignorance plays off against Jonathan‟s quest for knowledge. 
Within this dialectic, Alex is representative of the perceived knowledge that twenty-first 
century Western culture (specifically American culture) believes that it holds about the 
Holocaust. In the early part of his narrative, Alex represents himself as a man of the world, a 
man brimming with knowledge and experience: “I have tutored Little Igor to be a man of the 
world. For an example, I exhibited him a smutty magazine three days yore, so that he should 
be appraised of all the positions in which I am carnal” (3). All of Alex‟s knowledge, however, is 
later revealed to be a part of his narrative device—a story that, like Ruth, he tells himself in 
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order to reassure and reaffirm his existence: “all of the stories that I told you about my girls 
who dub me All Night, Baby, and Currency were not-truths, and they were not befitting not-
truths. I think I manufacture these not-truths because it makes me feel like a premium person” 
(144). In this manner, Alex‟s „knowledge‟ of the world is very similar to the „knowledge‟ of the 
Holocaust constructed within cultural memory; we tell ourselves the story of the Holocaust, 
and this act of narration removes the need for any further traumatic confrontation with the 
reality of the past. Although ostensibly the tour-guide within the narrative, entrusted with 
leading Jonathan on a journey through strange, foreign lands and languages, Alex himself is 
on a journey towards knowledge, even though initially he does not realise this. This journey 
leads him to an awareness of his history and heritage, of who he is, and of his position in the 
world: “That is a dream that I have woken up from. I will never see America, and neither will 
Little Igor, and I understand that now” (241). However, this journey of self-discovery for Alex 
also leads to the suicide of his grandfather, following revelations about his behaviour during 
the war (During an Aktion, Alex Sr., afraid for his own wife and child, ignored the pleas for 
help from his Jewish best friend with the result that the latter was killed along with the other 
Jews in the village). The grandson of a passive bystander to the horrors of the Holocaust, 
Alex himself becomes the archetype of a bystander (to Jonathan‟s quest) who is drawn in and 
tainted by his association with the events of the Holocaust. Ultimately, Alex‟s constructed self-
narrative is blown apart by the facts of history, and by the memory of his grandfather‟s 
(in)actions.  
If Alex is the embodiment of well-meaning ignorance within Everything Is Illuminated, then 
Jonathan begins the novel as a representation of the reader‟s quest for knowledge. In 
narrative terms, Jonathan is almost Alex‟s double: they are the same age and both have a 
history and heritage within Ukraine. However, because of the intervention of history, Jonathan 
has been raised in America and has now returned to the birthplace of his grandfather, seeking 
a narrative account of his own heritage: “I want to see Trachimbrod… to see what it‟s like, 
how my grandfather grew up, where I would be right now if it weren‟t for the war” (59). It is 
expected that the reader will identify with Jonathan in his quest for knowledge, he being “the 
hero.” Whilst this is certainly the case, it is also true, as we have seen, that the reader 
experiences a certain amount of identification with Alex as well. Thus it is possible to argue 
that Jonathan and Alex represent two sides of the same character, symbiotically linked by the 
absence of memory that characterises cultural amnesia. As the narrative arrives in what 
remains of Trachimbrod, the trajectories of the two characters cross: at the last remaining 
house in the Shtetl, examining the physical traces of memories guarded by the only survivor 
of the Nazi massacre. It is here that Alex begins his journey into awareness as he begins to 
uncover his grandfather‟s act. Jonathan, on the other hand, moves from knowledge towards 
the absence of knowledge: there is no story, no narrative for him to uncover. Jonathan‟s 
moment of „illumination‟ is, paradoxically, the revelation of no-knowledge. In the absence of 
either history or memory, Jonathan is forced to fill the space with a fictional narrative; he thus 
completes the circle of the characters‟ respective journeys by ending where Alex began, by 
substituting a fictionalised account of himself and his past. It is following the moment of 
„illumination‟ that the outlines of each character become increasingly blurred, or as Alex writes 
to Jonathan: “We are with each other, working on the same story, and I am certain that you 
can also feel it. Do you know […] that I am your grandmother and you are Grandfather, and 
that I am Alex and you are you, and that I am you and you are me? Do you not comprehend 
that we can bring each other safety and peace?” (214). The dialectical relationship enacted 
between Alex and Jonathan serves to embody the complexity of the reader‟s relationship to 
the Holocaust within Everything Is Illuminated: at once knowledgeable and without 
knowledge, seeking answers but forced to embrace fiction as the only available narrative 
response. This dialectic also encompasses much of the modern cultural response to the 
Holocaust: within the narrative of Everything Is Illuminated, Alex is Jonathan and Jonathan is 
Alex, grandson of victim and grandson of bystander become indistinguishable. For 
Eaglestone, this relationship “seems to stress an awareness of the seamless web of human 
relations, and that a novel about the Holocaust is also a novel about all the others less or 
more involved” (131).  
The notion of „substituting words‟ as a paradigm for understanding cultural amnesia is 
further apparent within Everything Is Illuminated in the form of the language used by Alex to 
construct his illusory self-narrative. In a clear echo of Edek‟s idiosyncratic language-use within 
Anna Hunter, The Amnesiac Consciousness of the Contemporary Holocaust Novel  45 
 
Synthesis 2 (Fall 2010): 38-47 
http://www.enl.uoa.gr/synthesis/issue2_Hunter.htm  
Too Many Men, Alex is an expert in mistranslation. It is easy to identify his broken English as 
a representation of the shattering effect that the Holocaust has had on both language and 
culture as a whole. In particular, Alex‟s constant malapropisms such as “seeing-eye bitch” and 
“I have a miniature brother who dubs me Alli” (1) serve as a reminder of the disjunction 
between signified and signifier within the amnesiac consciousness; microcosmically citing the 
inadequacy of both language and narrative to frame the absences of cultural memory. It is 
interesting that Ruth Rothwax is comforted by her father‟s unique approach to the English 
language: “Ruth was too distressed to be reassured by his pronunciation of „lounge.‟ From the 
day he had learned the word he had pronounced it „lunge‟” (161); Edek‟s persistent 
mispronunciation marks him out as a non-native speaker of English and by implication 
threads his Holocaust experience into every line of his speech. The fact that Ruth is 
reassured, rather than threatened, by this discord suggests that it speaks to her of the only 
cultural identity that she has ever known: the mistranslated identity of exile. But Alex does not 
only mistranslate language: he also misrepresents history, memory and experience. In 
addition to representing the „constructed‟ knowledge of the reader, Alex in his ignorance also 
acts as a foil through which Foer is able to test the reader‟s engagement with the Holocaust. 
As I have mentioned, there is little overt reference to the Holocaust within any of the three 
narrative strands, apart from at the climax of the novel, where all three strands converge at 
the events of 1941. Throughout the remainder of the text, it is left to the reader to pick up on 
signposts and clues that are dropped by Foer, usually littering Alex‟s narrative: an example of 
this is his lack of understanding as to the true nature of the holiday firm operated by his father. 
Alex‟s lack of knowledge serves to sharpen the reader‟s own appreciation of what the 
company name, „Heritage Touring,‟ really stands for. The effect here is that Alex‟s ignorance 
highlights the reader‟s own knowledge. There are many more examples of this throughout 
Alex‟s narratives: when he anticipates Jonathan‟s reaction to the blue and yellow streamers 
decorating Lvov station (“Perhaps he would think that the yellow and blue papers were for 
him, because I know that they are the Jewish colours” [31]), the reader is able to substitute 
the yellow star and the Blauschein into Alex‟s semi-approximation of history. Likewise when 
he describes “the Jews from the history books, with no hairs and prominent bones” (32), the 
reader automatically substitutes his/her knowledge of well-known Holocaust images such as 
those of the liberation of Bergen-Belsen. Of course, Alex‟s version of history is coloured by his 
social environment: he has been brought up in Ukraine, for half of his life under Soviet rule. 
He has not had the same access to the Holocaust that the Western reader has had; thus his 
cultural memory of the event is drastically different, almost non-existent in fact. This explicit 
lack serves in turn to highlight the inadequacy of the systems of shared meaning that the 
reader calls upon in order to fill the gaps in Alex‟s narrative; for by assuming a position of 
ontological authority with regard to the Holocaust, the readers simultaneously reveal 
themselves to be lacking in awareness and understanding as to the untenability of such a 
position. The impossibility of this perspective is distilled within the narrative of Everything Is 
Illuminated in a meditation upon the meanings of the word „artefact‟: “the product of a 
successful attempt to make a purposeful, useless, beautiful thing out of a past-tensed fact. It 
can never be art, and it can never be fact” (202). This reveals the inherent truth at the heart of 
contemporary Holocaust narrative, a truth which both Ruth and Jonathan appear to resist: it is 
caught in a dialectic between art and fact, can never be both and never be neither. The quest 
for knowledge as a remedy to cultural amnesia within these texts is destined to be 
inadequate: fact can never ameliorate the drive for emotional engagement, much as language 
can never fully suture the rupture in identity (both individual and cultural) that the absence of 
memory instigates. 
Conclusion: Paradigms of Cultural Amnesia 
The narratives of Too Many Men and Everything Is Illuminated are both centred on an act of 
pilgrimage, insofar as the narrative is driven by the physical journey of a central protagonist 
as he/she undertakes a quest for knowledge that will heal an amnesiac rift in personal 
identity, such as that posited by Hirsch‟s theory of postmemory. The broader narrative 
structure indicated by this quest for knowledge is repeated across a range of contemporary 
Holocaust narratives such as The History of Love by Nicole Krauss, Fugitive Pieces by Anne 
Michaels and The Final Solution by Michael Chabon. All of these texts can be categorised as 
quest narratives, with further knowledge of the Holocaust being their ultimate goal. The 
repetition of this narrative pattern suggests a congruence between the revelation of 
Anna Hunter, The Amnesiac Consciousness of the Contemporary Holocaust Novel  46 
 
Synthesis 2 (Fall 2010): 38-47 
http://www.enl.uoa.gr/synthesis/issue2_Hunter.htm  
knowledge and narrative resolution, of the type identified above by Eaglestone as being 
inherently problematic. Read in this way, the repeated insistence upon achieving resolution 
through knowledge signifies a fundamental failure of engagement within the genre of 
contemporary Holocaust fiction, which is repeated and re-enacted within each narrative 
encounter. Thus the cultural imagination that produces and consumes these narratives 
reproduces the amnesiac consciousness that they contain by repeating the same process 
without developing beyond the previous failed attempt. As noted at the outset of this paper, 
Stier locates this continued collective effort to achieve a memorial engagement with the 
Holocaust within an inherent ability to forget previous failed attempts. I would argue that this is 
rather the work of a cultural amnesia that is renewed by the traumatic impossibility of working-
through which is signalled by each failure. In this manner, the amnesiac qualities exhibited by 
characters such as Ruth Rothwax, Alexander Perchov, and Jonathan Safran Foer become 
substitutes for the reader‟s own amnesiac quest for absent memory. Once again, amnesia 
can be understood as narrative substituted for experience. In an analysis of counter-
monuments to the Holocaust that present “a model of forgetting integrated into the very fabric 
of memorialisation,” Stier identifies the possibility of “the monument as an amnesiac 
construction—to remind visitors of the problematics of memorials” (213). The doubling of the 
amnesiac consciousness within texts such as those under discussion here invites us to read 
these narratives as amnesiac constructions in this manner. It may be impossible (and in fact 
entirely inappropriate) for narrative constructions of memory to fill the void left by the absence 
of genuine memorial engagement. However, by drawing the reader‟s attention to his/her own 
amnesia, such texts highlight the aporia inherent within any attempt to construct a symbolic 
memorial to the Holocaust. For James Young, one of the only appropriate ways to engage 
with the damaging impact of the Holocaust is to recognise the limits of engagement:  
so long as we are dependent on the „vocabulary‟ of our culture and its sustaining archetype, it 
may not be possible to generate entirely new responses to catastrophe. It may now be possible, 
however, to respond from within our traditional critical paradigms with self-awareness of where 
traditionally conditioned responses lead us in the world. (192)  
In an echo of this sentiment, Stier comments that “the ideal form of Holocaust memory bears 
within it a sense of its own deconstructive potential” (17). The paradigm of cultural amnesia 
presented within contemporary fictional narratives of the Holocaust thus facilitates an 
engagement not with memory, but with amnesia; the revelation of knowledge at the climax of 
the quest narrative is inverted to become a revelation of our own lack of appropriate cultural 
memory. The acceptance of this, and the continued effort to understand in the face of the 
knowledge that one will never understand, enables us to at least honour the continuing 
trauma of survivors and ensures that, whilst we must learn to live with cultural amnesia, we 
cannot forget. 
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